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What has brought Macedonia back into the global spotlight? 
Basically: the police operation in Kumanovo, 9 and 10 May 
2015, which catapulted Macedonia into media headlines 
around the world. This large-scale operation against what 
officials identified as a terrorist group (partly infiltrating 
from Kosovo) ignited fears of fresh internal ethnic clashes 
like those of 2001, when Macedonian security forces were 
fighting ethnic Albanian rebels. In 2001 the country was 
on the verge of a civil war, which was prevented thanks to 
the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, ultimately 
a power-sharing agreement.  The concern in 2015 has been 
whether inter-ethnic clashes might erupt again.
The situation is highly complex. Macedonia has been 
involved in a serious political crisis which culminated in the 
release of wiretapping material by the main opposition party 
SDSM1 in February 2015, with compelling evidence of the 
misuse of public positions by high government officials: elec-
tion fraud, corruption, murder cover-up, and more. The wide 
extent of the wiretapping, which according to the SDSM had 
been conducted by the ruling VMRO-DPMNE,2 was alleged to 
have involved more than 20,000 persons from various walks 
of life, ranging from politicians and high government offi-
cials, to religious leaders, civil society activists, and others. 
These two incidents – the wiretapping, and the police clamp-
down – are but the tip of the iceberg. Macedonia, once the 
Western Balkan frontrunner as regards EU and NATO acces-
sion, has become one of the laggards in the region. Take, 
for instance, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 
which involves provisions for future EU membership of coun-
tries of the Western Balkans. Macedonia was the first to sign 
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such an agreement, back in 2001. On 1 June 2015 there was a 
celebratory atmosphere in Sarajevo when the Stabilisation and 
Association agreement signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina came 
into force. Compared with Macedonia we are looking at a time-
lag of more than a decade. Yet Macedonia is still not a member of 
the EU or NATO – and although Macedonia signed its Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreement before Croatia, that country was 
admitted to the EU in 2013.
There are many factors contributing to the diminished position 
of Macedonia, internationally as well as at home, especially 
important have been the country’s stalemated Euro-Atlantic 
integration efforts, as well as the democratic backslide. In fact, 
these two processes are interlinked and feed into each other. 
The halt in Euro-Atlantic integration has been seen as resulting 
primarily from the Greek veto on Macedonia joining the EU and 
NATO. Ever since 2008, when the Greek authorities vetoed Mac-
edonia’s accession to NATO at the Bucharest Summit, they have 
also blocked Macedonia’s accession negotiations with the EU, 
despite the EU Commission’s recommendations for the country 
to move forward with the process as the next step of the enlarge-
ment process. As a result, the EU Council and other EU institu-
tions have their hands tied when it comes to producing any kind 
of greater engagement with Macedonia.  
The enlargement policy, based on fair principles and clear bench-
marks, is the EU’s strongest carrot and stick for encouraging 
changes in aspirant countries, including Macedonia. This well-
known formula has worked in Central and most of Eastern Europe, 
but in the case of Macedonia it faces a considerable problem.  
The carrot/stick approach cannot be deployed effectively 
because of the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece, 
which has been dragging on for more than 20 years, still causing 
serious headaches not only in Macedonia and the region but in 
Brussels as well. According to Athens, the root of the problem 
1 SDSM: Social Democratic Union of Macedonia. 
2 VMRO-DPMNE - Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Dem-
ocratic Party for Macedonian National Unity.
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lies in ‘irredentist’ policies adopted in Skopje with regard 
to the historic region of Macedonia. This view is dismissed 
as absurd in Macedonia’s capital Skopje; on that side of the 
border, the problem is seen in terms of Greece’s negation 
of Macedonian identity markers like language, culture and 
history. Official mediation efforts by the UN have failed to 
yield concrete results. The blockage of Macedonia’s EU path 
creates frustrations among the populace: what is the point 
in the Commission’s recommendations for negotiations on 
accession if this is not realistic? EU fatigue fuelled by govern-
ment propaganda through state-controlled media has weak-
ened public support for Macedonia’s accession to the EU. 
On the other hand, the lack of concrete movement in the EU 
enlargement process, and of an effective carrot-and-stick 
policy towards Macedonia, has made the ruling political elite 
comfortable with the status quo. While the government in 
Skopje deserves some credit for its commitment to making 
Macedonia a more favourable environment for foreign invest-
ment, and improving the economy overall, there have been 
doubts about the negative track record on democratic reform 
and actual backsliding in this respect. Take, for example, the 
Reporters Without Borders media freedoms scorecard: from 
being ranked in 34th position in 2009, the situation in Mace-
donia has dramatically worsened, resulting in a ranking of no. 
117 in 2015 – the lowest in the region.3 Freedom House in its 
2015 report has also downgraded the political rights score for 
Macedonia (from 3 to 4), describing it as a ‘partly-free’ state.4  
Wiretapping scandal
The tipping point to the political crisis in Macedonia came 
in February 2015 when the main opposition party, SDSM, 
started leaking, on a weekly basis, wiretapped material of 
high government officials alleged to be involved in criminal 
activities. SDSM’s leader, Zoran Zaev, has claimed that the 
party in power intentionally and illegally wiretapped more 
than 20,000 Macedonian citizens over a period of several 
years. He points the finger especially at VMRO’s power fig-
ure and former chief of counterintelligence, Saso Mijalkov, 
whom he asserts was responsible for this massive illegal 
surveillance programme. The ruling VMRO-DPMNE party, 
however, has accused the opposition leader of collaborating 
with foreign intelligence services and people from the Min-
istry of Interior for the wiretapped material, describing this 
as coup-d’état attempt. So far there no information has been 
published as to the identity or identities of the foreign intel-
ligence services said to be behind such wiretapping. 
Months after the revelations started, the International Repub-
lican Institute conducted an opinion poll about Macedonia’s 
political landscape. The high support previously enjoyed by 
VMRO-DPMNE (December 2014: 26%), has gone down (July 
2015: 23%), while support for SDSM grew by 1%, leading to 
11%.5  The scandalous content of the revelations have helped 
the main opposition party to make a comeback, grabbing 
public attention as well as media attention. Citing setbacks 
to democracy as the reason, the SDSM has boycotted activity 
in the Parliament, and after the April 2014 elections decided 
to function outside of it, refusing to recognize the election 
results, which it says have been falsified. 
What may appear to be an unfortunate decision by the SDSM 
can be interpreted as a reaction to its perceptions that the 
political playing field between the party in power and the 
opposition is not a level one. To illustrate the difficulties the 
opposition party had in communicating its message to the 
public we need look no further than SDSM press conferences 
where, due to political control of the media, the most influen-
tial media did not attend, and the opposition could not get its 
message across. As the SDSM leader revealed leaked materi-
als of high-level officials, interest in the revelations became 
increasingly intense. The content became a major mobilizing 
factor behind the accumulated protest amongst the public 
that finally took to the streets of Skopje. Every afternoon at 
around 6 PM for several weeks, protesters, including civil 
society activists, gathered in front of the government build-
ing to express their dissatisfaction with the ruling party and 
demanding major changes. These culminated in the protest 
on the 17 May where several thousand people from across the 
country demanded the resignation of the current leadership. 
The protests were rich in symbolism: apart from the sheer 
numbers involved, they also demonstrated the mobilization 
of people from different ethnic and social backgrounds who 
would otherwise rarely come together, given the extreme eth-
nic polarization of Macedonian society. 
The international community, represented through various 
embassies in Skopje, decided to exercise political pressure on 
the government as well as the opposition party, by asking for 
more concrete action regarding what the leaked materials had 
revealed. The very next day, the Prime Minister instructed three 
central figures in the leaked material – the Minister of Interior, 
the Counterintelligence Chief and the Minister for Transport 
and Communications – to resign, as they duly did shortly after-
wards. This was followed by the embassies holding talks with 
SDSM members, who were urged to return to the Parliament. 
As a result of mediation efforts by the European Commis-
sion and the European Parliament, supported by the USA, a 
deal between the ruling and opposition parties was reached, 
aimed at leading to early elections in April 2016. A transi-
tional period of several months is to pave the way for the 
elections. Points in the deal include: 
• A new government is to be sworn by 15 January 2016. The 
government will be led by VMRO-DPMNE appointee whose 
functions would be limited to organizing elections in April. 
This is a systematic solution to be practised with every gen-
eral election. 
• The main opposition party SDSM will return to the Parlia-
ment by 1st September 2015. 
• By 20 October 2015, SDSM is to appoint a new Minister of 
the Interior, after consulting the ruling parties; likewise 
3 Reporters Without Borders, 2015 World Press Freedom Index: https://in-
dex.rsf.org/#!/index-details. 
4 Freedom House Report 2015 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2015/macedonia#.VdWDkrTfLww 
5 IRI:  Survey of Macedonian public opinion. http://www.iri.org/sites/
default/files/2014%20September%2026%20Survey%20of%20Mac-
edonian%20Public%20Opinion%2C%20August%2029-September%20
5%2C%202014-English_0.pdf
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as regards a new Minister of Labour, deputy ministers of 
Finance, Agriculture, and Information Society and Admin-
istration. The deputy ministers will have veto rights. 
• By 15 September 2015, the appointment of a Special 
Prosecutor, who will be in charge of dealing with the wire-
tapping scandal. 
Implementation technicalities remain highly polarizing, and 
may have the potential to plunge Macedonia into deeper 
political crises.  
Macedonia’s security challenges – Kumanovo 
The political instability in the country was followed by a deterio-
rating security situation. Once again, Macedonia was confronted 
by a security challenge that, unless managed well, could have 
been explosive both for Macedonia and the region as a whole.
In the course of only a few weeks several things happened.  An 
incident in the border region with Kosovo occurred when gun-
men attacked the local police station. Shortly afterwards, on 9 
May, a major police action was mounted in the northern city 
of Kumanovo, close to the Kosovo-Serbia border. Macedonian 
police initiated a police action seeking to detain an armed 
group which, according to official sources, planned attacks on 
strategic targets in Macedonia. The operation as such alarmed 
the entire region. Neighbouring Serbia, Kosovo and Bulgaria 
increased their alertness levels and beefed up security along 
their borders with Macedonia. Officials have stated that some 
members of the group in question had fought in the wars that 
swept across the region in the 1990s and that some had been 
fighting in the Middle East.  The police action resulted in 18 
dead (10 gunmen, 8 policemen). More than 30 police officers 
were injured during the 30-hour-long exchange of fire.
One of the most debated questions regarding the shootings 
in Kumanovo, frequently raised in the national and inter-
national media, concerned the timing of this police action. 
It occurred against the backdrop of one of the most difficult 
political crisis in the history of the country, and only one 
week before an announced massive anti-government rally. 
Many went even indicating that this might have been a 
government-planned event aimed at deflecting public 
attention away from the compromising materials which the 
SDSM had been leaking to the public, revealing fraud and 
corruption on the part of high government officials. Accord-
ing to this theory, the Kumanovo incident was intended to 
diminish the importance of the leaked materials and foster 
support for the government in its policies for re-establishing 
law and order in the country. This theory has been widely 
speculated about, not only in Macedonia but throughout in 
the region as well. Speculations were further inflamed by a 
press conference held by the Macedonian President focusing 
on the Kumanovo event, when he publically stated that state 
institutions and he personally had been informed about the 
existence of the group early in 2015 in turn leading to the 
question: why were these people allowed to infiltrate from 
neighbouring Kosovo? Even more importantly, why had 
the authorities allowed such a period to pass, permitting 
infiltration in such a densely populated area as the city of 
Kumanovo? Moreover, the president added that some of the 
gunmen had been fighting in the Middle East. 
Of course such a theory remains only a theory. The actual 
magnitude of the operation, the number of casualties 
reported and the regional repercussions of the shootings in 
Kumanovo may point to the genuineness of the government’s 
position. It is still too early to know, as the Macedonian Min-
istry of Internal Affairs has not shared many details with the 
public; however, there is an ongoing investigation which is 
intended to provide further details. 
The Kumanovo incident, for good or bad, may have pro-
vided a signal to authorities across the region, as well as the 
international community, to be wary of the deadly cocktail 
that results when mixing whatever the ideology of foreign 
fighters may be with notions of ethno-nationalism. This can 
prove to be a recipe for fast-tracking radicalization across the 
Western Balkans. If that should come to pass, then we would 
not be talking about lone actors, but well-organized groups. 
That would make current efforts of the authorities across 
the Western Balkans aimed at solving the challenges posed 
by the foreign-fighter threat extremely difficult; and inflat-
ing the ethno-nationalistic element of the dilemma would 
hinder regional cooperation on security issues. The moment 
ethno-politics enters the equation of how intelligence serv-
ices, police and other relevant actors are to conduct their 
work, the entire response of the security system may become 
endangered. A security vacuum, open to exploitation by 
radical groups to vast effect, could then emerge.
Russia expanding its influence in the Balkans
The political, administrative and security fragility of Macedo-
nia has smoothed the way for the entry of Russian influence 
as a way of expanding the current influence Russia already 
has in the region, primarily through Serbia. With the recent 
events in Macedonia (the Kumanovo police action; anti-gov-
ernment protests in Skopje), Russia has become particularly 
vocal in backing  the current leadership in Skopje. As regards 
Kumanovo, Kremlin provided clear support to the police 
action; with the protests it held that the protests in Skopje 
were organized by Western-inspired NGOs seeking to follow 
the ‘colour revolution’ scenario in Macedonia.6  
It is very difficult to assess the sudden upsurge of interest in 
Macedonia. Statement after statement has been coming from 
Moscow, several times a week – definitely a new departure.7 
This can prove overwhelming for a small country like Mace-
donia. For example, until January 2015 the Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs had not issued a single statement on Mac-
edonia after the post-armed conflict years of the early 2000s.
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation http://archive.mid.
ru/bdomp/ns-reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e700419c7a/44257
b100055ec1543257e4000407da2!OpenDocument (in Russian). 
7 List of statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation available here: http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-reuro.nsf!Ope
nDatabase&Start=16&Count=30&Expand=26 (in Russian).
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Russia’s support to the current leadership in Skopje can be 
seen primarily as a result of the Kremlin trying to promote its 
foreign policy objectives in Europe. Most of the statements 
can be seen as attempts to promote Russia’s position on 
Ukraine. For instance, among its first statements in January/
February, Russia highlighted the need for adopting a resolu-
tion which would prohibit unconstitutional coups under the 
OSCE framework, clearly supporting Gruevski’s position on 
the wiretapping scandal.8 This is a clear example of Russia 
seeking to promote its own foreign policy objectives. An addi-
tional example can be seen in the maintenance and reinforce-
ment of the Kremlin’s non-recognition position on Kosovo: 
the matter is described as an unresolved issue where there is 
a ‘lack of law abidance and security’, referring to the 22 April 
2015 incident at Gošince on the Macedonia-Kosovo border.9 
Another factor can be Russia’s vision of expanding its energy 
policy in the Balkans and Central Europe, circumventing 
transit through Ukraine by building the ‘Turkish Stream’. 
Some initially proposed routes have involved crossing Tur-
key, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. The current 
Macedonian leadership has been favourable to the idea, and 
Russia will need a stable political and security climate in the 
countries through which the pipeline would transit.    
Apart from official channels such as Russia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and embassies, Macedonia has been heavily 
exposed to the Kremlin propaganda machinery, which has 
been providing disinformation of a speculative character. 
Unfamiliar with sophisticated Russian propaganda, the 
media in Macedonia have picked up on the sensationalism in 
stories on Macedonia and further disseminated it among the 
public. Exposure to this kind of misinformation will influ-
ence the Macedonian public, at least in the medium term. 
That being said, it is worth noting that vast majority of the 
population continues to view NATO and EU Enlargement as a 
main priority for their country’s future. 
Conclusions 
Macedonia finds itself at a crossroads once again. Internally 
it has experienced democracy backsliding, intensified with 
the blockage by Greece of Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic path. A 
country that was once at the front of the queue now is among 
the last. Precious time has been lost in trying to circumvent 
the Greek veto, but all attempts have failed, because there 
has been no real movement on resolving the name issue. 
On the international stage, Macedonia has lost sympathy 
and is now considered more of a headache than a shining 
example. This shows clearly how much the country needs 
international assistance in getting back on track with the 
important matter of Euro-Atlantic integration. Macedonia 
should, without delay, open accession negotiations with the 
EU, while negotiating the name dispute with Greece. The 
issue of the official name of the country should be resolved 
in parallel with the accession talks. The example of Serbia, 
where the Kosovo issue was put under Chapter 35, should be 
considered seriously as an option. Without movement on the 
path to EU accession, it will be a question of when, and not 
if, political instability becomes serious, and democracy will 
continue to backslide. The EU has a moral responsibility to 
unlock this problem. 8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation http://archive.mid.
ru/bdomp/ns-reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e700419c7a/44257
b100055ec1543257ddf002754d8! OpenDocument (in Russian).
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation  http://archive.mid.
ru/bdomp/ns-reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e700419c7a/44257
b100055ec1543257e2f005942c7! OpenDocument (in Russian) 
